This paper analyzes the determinants of illiquidity as well as its impact on asset pricing for purely call-auction traded stocks on the Berlin Stock Exchange using 22 years of daily data .We use the Lesmond et al. (1999) measure of transaction costs to proxy illiquidity. Our results show that transaction costs were low and comparable to today's costs. Liquidity was negatively correlated with information asymmetry, particularly being low for small and distressed stocks and in crises times. Furthermore, liquidity concerns were a major driver of asset pricing: we find significant illiquidity level and illiquidity risk premia as well as an explicit premium for the absence of liquidity providers.
I. Introduction
In this paper, we empirically investigate theoretical predictions for the interplay of transaction costs, liquidity provision and asset pricing using daily stock prices from the Berlin Stock Exchange from the period . The data are especially insightful for studying the link between insider behaviour and liquidity because the design of the market closely resembles the assumptions of sequential auction games (as in Kyle, 1985; Madhavan, 1992; etc.) . More specifically, the Berlin Stock Exchange, which was then the major German stock exchange, was a call auction market with an official broker arranging one price fixing a day. The broker was prohibited to take positions in the market. A large stakeholder (such as a custodian bank), however, could play a role of a liquidity provider, and there exists anecdotal evidence that he often did. However, unlike a typical market maker, such a liquidity provider could possess some insider information about the fundamental value of the stock and could decide to exploit it and demand liquidity instead of providing it. A close alignment of the actual market design and theoretical assumptions allows us to distinguish these two types of behaviour from stock price dynamics: a high negative serial correlation of stock returns indicates liquidity supply by a large stakeholder, whereas a positive correlation of returns could indicate speculation based on private information of this large stakeholder (Llorente et al. 2002) .
One of the implications of theoretical market microstructure models is that a high information-to-noise ratio leads to low liquidity (e.g. Madhavan 1992, Rochet and Vila, 1994: 145) . We test this hypothesis indirectly, analyzing the impact of states with likely high information asymmetry on transaction costs. We apply the Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999, further LOT) indirect measure of transaction costs as a liquidity measure and use small and distressed companies as high information-to-noise states. We also provide further evidence on liquidity deterioration in crises times, comparable with findings for modern US stock market (Pastor and Stambaugh 2003) . Moreover, we investigate, whether liquidity supply behavior of a large stakeholder had an impact on transaction costs.
Beyond measuring transaction costs and identifying the link between information asymmetry and liquidity, we address three theoretical propositions with respect to the liquidity premia. First, investors dislike illiquid stocks and require a premium for holding them (Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Amihud and Mendelson, 1986) . By and large, the empirical literature supports this view (Asparouhova et al., 2009; Eleswarapu, 1997; Chalmers and Kadlec, 1998) . Second, investors dislike stocks which are illiquid in bad times, as they can not be used to offset income flow shocks (e.g. Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Pastor and Stambaugh 2003) . Third, liquidity provision by large stakeholders benefits liquidity traders, while liquidity demand from large stakeholders destroys the wealth of uninformed traders and deters their participation in such stock.
Whereas the first and the second hypotheses have been tested on the modern continuous trading data, the third one, to our knowledge, is novel to the literature. We assess these three hypotheses in an asset pricing framework, where LOT transaction costs proxy for illiquidity, a regression coefficient of individual transaction costs shocks on market returns proxies for the co-movement of illiquidity and market downturns, and (negative) first order autocorrelation of daily returns proxies for liquidity provision by large stakeholders.
We show that transaction costs at the Berlin Stock Exchange a century ago were pretty low and of about the same size as they are in modern financial markets. The LOT measure indicates that the cost for a roundtrip transaction were about 0.97 percent of the share price. This compares to an estimate of 1.23 percent for the largest decile of firms listed at the New York Stock Exchange for the period 1963 -1990 (Lesmond et al., 1999 . We find support for the negative impact of the information-to-noise ratio on liquidity: transaction costs are higher for small stocks and after a year of negative returns. Moreover, illiquidity increases in crises times. Liquidity provision seems to moderate illiquidity, but this result is not robust to alternative specifications.
The estimation of multifactor asset pricing models provides strong support of a liquidity premium: for one percentage point higher transaction costs, investors require an about 3.6 percentage points higher expected annual return. We find a significant positive premium for liquidity risk: investors impose a significant discount on the price of securities, which transaction costs rise stronger in the case of market downturns.
Moreover, we find support for the liquidity provision discount: securities, in which large stakeholders rather demand liquidity than provide it, yield higher expected returns. The magnitude of this impact is economically strongly significant, being up to 4% per annum.
Thereby usual asset pricing benchmarks -market risk and size -turn out to have no impact on the cross-section of stock prices.
Our finding of comparatively low transaction costs supports the theoretical superiority of call auction markets over the nowadays prevalent continuous trading or dealership markets (Pagano and Roell, 1996) . Empirical results using data from modern markets are not as clear cut. For example, data from the Tel Aviv stock exchange show that prices and liquidity increase when stocks move from a call auction market to continuous trading (Amihud et al, 1997; Kalay et al., 2002) . However, data from the Singapore and London stock exchange illustrate that the introduction of opening and closing call auctions decreases the extent of price manipulation and increases the extent of price discovery (Chang et al., 2008; Chelley-Steeley, 2008) . Moreover, Pagano and Schwartz (2003) show that introduction of the closing auction on the Paris Bourse in 1996 led to the reduction of execution costs. In addition, experimental studies point out that call auction markets reduce asymmetric information between different groups of traders and lead to lower transaction costs, but reduce the speed of information processing (Schmitzlein, 1996; Theissen, 2000) .
The liquidity dynamics of a call auction market seems to be very similar to that of modern continuous trading markets. In particular, liquidity dry-outs found during the Balkan war crisis 1913 and after the bankruptcy of Leipziger bank 1901 are consistent with findings of liquidity drops during the Mideast oil crisis 1973 and after the LTCM collapse and Russian default in 1998 reported by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) . As the bankruptcy of the Leipziger bank 1901 was accompanied by an aggregate market decline this finding is in line with deteriorating liquidity in times of major market downturns reported by Chordia et al. (2001) .
Our evidence on the liquidity premium suggests a stable relationship between liquidity and asset pricing through time and across market types. Despite relatively low transaction costs, the liquidity premium observed in our data corresponds in magnitude to the one reported for modern day markets with continuous trading: 3.6% annually for 1% transaction cost in our historical auction market compared to 3.5% for US markets in 1964 -1999 , reported by Acharya and Pedersen (2005 .
We find the liquidity risk premium much stronger pronounced than in the recent literature. Its statistical significance is higher than for the modern US market provided by Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and is in line with significant results reported by Lee (2011) for modern global markets. The economic significance, however, exceeds both modern US and global market findings: our data yields an about fivefold larger premium compared to modern day US (Acharya and Pedersen 2005) and about a fourfold larger premium with respect to modern global markets (Lee 2011) .
Our main contribution is the evidence of required return discount for liquidity provision.
Our results show that on top of usual liquidity level measures, investors care about the liquidity supply behavior from large stakeholders. Given the same level of transaction costs, stocks where large stakeholders exploit there private information instead of providing liquidity are worth substantially less, as they yield up to 4% p.a. higher expected return. Such relevance of liquidity providers for asset pricing can be related to liquidity risk, as these agents could still trade in situations of sharp market downturns, whereas other investors would not, thus guaranteeing some minimal liquidity in critical periods.
We also provide a minor contribution to the methodology, introducing confidence intervals for LOT estimates of transaction costs, what allows making inference about different liquidity levels across stock and time.
Beyond contributing to the financial economics literature, our paper also supports recent findings from economic history showing that Germany's historical stock market was quite efficient. Starting with the work of Weigt (2005) , it has been shown that stock price differentials among German stock exchanges (Weigt, 2005: 199) and between the Berlin Stock Exchange and other major European stock exchanges were small (Baltzer, 2006) , that stock prices reflected the risk and return characteristics of the shares quite well (Weigt, 2005: 224) , and that the Berlin Stock Exchange was weakly information efficient (Gelman and Burhop, 2008) . Furthermore, Gehrig and Fohlin (2006) estimate in a paper closely related to our work that the effective spreads of samples of Berlin traded shares during the benchmark years 1880, 1890, 1900, and 1910 were low and decreasing in firm size.
The remaining parts of the paper are organised as follows. In Section II we give a short description of price fixing at the Berlin Stock Exchange at the turn of the 20 th century and describe our data sources. The LOT measure of the round-trip transaction costs is illustrated in Section III, along with a brief description of implemented econometric techniques. The results are presented in Section IV, followed by robustness checks in Section V and conclusion in Section VI.
II. Market Structure and Data Description
Shares were traded at the Berlin Stock Exchange six days peer week using a call auction mechanism. Prices were fixed once a day by official, government appointed brokers. The brokers' association allocated two official brokers to each stock listed at the exchange.
They jointly fixed the official price of the share and they both had the duty to act as brokers for the stock, i.e. they could not decline to take orders. They started taking orders at noon and stopped taking orders not earlier than 1.30 p.m. and not later than 2 p.m. Orders were made orally by representatives of banks and other participants on the trading floor. The official broker orally repeated the order and his substitute recorded the order into the order book. The order book was arranged in four columns, one for unlimited buying orders, one for limited buying orders, one for unlimited selling orders, and one for limited selling orders. The official price had to reflect the true commerce at the stock exchange. At the official price, it had to be possible that all unlimited buy and sell orders as well as buy orders with a higher price limit and sell orders with a lower price limit were carried out. Whenever the official broker expected a major price change (i.e., a price change of more than one percent), he had to make a written announcement to the trading floor. Moreover, in this case, a state commissioner joined the two official brokers to monitor the price fixing. The first tentative price was prepared in public and all interested parties could attend this event. Moreover, it was still possible to place further orders or to cancel formerly made orders. Afterwards, the two official brokers went to the back office, where the official quotation was registered, signed by the state commissioner, and published in the official price list (Obst, 1921: 380, 386-392) .
Turning to transaction costs, we can distinguish three types of observable costs: taxes, broker fees, and bank fees. Transactions at German stock exchanges were taxed from 1881 onwards. More specifically for the period under consideration here, the stock market turnover tax was 0.01 percent of the underlying transaction value between 1892 and April 1894. From May 1894 onwards, the tax was doubled to 0.02 percent; another increase to 0.03 percent followed in October 1900. In addition to turnover taxes, the fees for brokers influence transaction costs. The fee for official brokers was 0.05 percent of the underlying transaction value (Gelman and Burhop, 2008) . Furthermore, fees for the banks or other intermediaries varied between 0.1 and 0.33 percent (Weigt, 2005: 192) . In sum, broker fees, fees for intermediaries, and turnover taxes added up to a total cost for a roundtrip transaction (i.e., buying and selling of a share) in the range of 0.252 to 0.82 percent. 1 To investigate the size of actual transaction costs and to evaluate whether they changed over time, we use daily stock prices for the period 31 December 1891 to 31 December 1913 collected from the Berliner Börsenzeitung -Germany's leading financial daily of the pre-1913 period -for a sample of 27 continuously traded corporations from the Berlin stock exchange. The data were obtained from Gelman and Burhop (2008) Notes: Mean and median returns are presented on the annual basis (location measure x300) for illustrative purposes.
* denotes significance of the autocorrelation coefficient on the 5 percent level.
Although our sample is skewed towards larger companies it spans a wide range of stocks in terms of size, from the largest (Deutsche Bank) to those ranked 590 th and 495 
III. LOT measure an econometric technique
In an information-efficient stock market, prices of stocks should incorporate new information instantaneously. On the real-world stock exchanges, however, the presence of transaction costs induces some deviations from such behaviour. Uncovering these deviations and analyzing them allows tracking back full transaction costs.
This idea is exploited in a measure of transaction costs, proposed by Lesmond et al. (1999) . The LOT measure reflects the total costs of a roundtrip transaction, which includes not only the difference between bid and ask prices, but also all further expenses carried by the trader, including the price change induced by the trade itself (so called price impact, see Lesmond 2005) . The LOT measure is based on the idea that transactions will only occur if the deviation of the market price from the true value of a stock is larger than the costs of a transaction. Thus, there are upper and lower thresholds -i l and i h -such that the measured return r is non-zero only if the true return exceeds the threshold:
The true return depends on the market return rm,t in a linear way: r * i,t = irm,t+ei,t.
The estimated difference between the upper and the lower threshold -i.e. i h less i l -is a measure of the roundtrip transaction costs.
We use the following maximum likelihood estimator, developed by Lesmond et al. (1999) , to estimate the LOT measure: The LOT measure thus includes the bid-ask spread, fees, transaction taxes, costs of information acquirement and processing, as well as price impact. Its size should be therefore larger than the regulated costs, i.e., the sum of broker fees, provisions, and transaction taxes. We calculate this measure for each company and each year, and then provide also aggregated estimates across companies and years.
In this paper we also calculate standard errors and confidence intervals for the transaction cost estimates, which is novel to the literature. It allows assessing the credibility of the estimates and inferring the significance of cross-section and time-series differences. We obtain standard errors for each stock i and year t from the standard expression: , we see it as justified to use it for the historical data in our study.
As we find considerable differences in transaction costs across companies, similar to Gehrig and Fohlin (2006), we run cross-section regressions of estimated average transaction costs on a set of explanatory variables:
where X denotes a vector of explanatory variables and  a vector of corresponding coefficients. However, as we observe remarkable time variation of transaction cost estimates we also run a panel regression: 
The corresponding standard errors for each k-th element of the risk-premia vector are calculated from the corrected time variance of the estimated premia:
where mt z denotes the excess return of the market index. For the risk factor k to be priced the corresponding risk premium should be significantly different from zero.
To obtain the illiquidity risk factor loadings
IL i
 we calculate the sensitivity of unpredicted transaction costs to market movements using the following linear regression:
Unpredicted illiquidity is defined as the residual from a second order panel vectorautoregression of transaction costs and annual stock returns (without dividends): Moreover, we find our transaction cost measures rather precisely estimated, with 95% confidence bounds being about 10 basis points for most of the years. Significant transaction cost increases are revealed in 1901, 1910, 1912 and 1913 relative to the respective previous years. Significant transaction cost decreases appear in 1894, 1902 and in 1911 as compared to the respective previous years. 5 It may come as a surprise that transaction costs were rather stable at the German stock exchange over the last century. We find that the 27 companies under study at the turn of the twentieth century had, on average, lower transaction costs than the 2 nd tier German The explanation may rather have informational origins, as market capitalization of companies usually proxies the information asymmetry (Llorente et al. 2002) . The intuition here is twofold: assuming the same share of trading relative to market capitalization across companies, the volume of trade for large companies was higher, allowing for faster incorporation of new information. Furthermore, large companies had probably better newspaper and analyst coverage, providing more thorough information to investors, thus decreasing information asymmetry. Therefore, it seems that lower information asymmetry lessened the proportion of informed trading and thus provided for lower transaction costs.
We also hypothesize that liquidity provision by large stakeholders, such as custodian banks of the issuing company, could have lowered transaction costs. We introduce two proxies for liquidity provision. Our main proxy is the first-order autocorrelation of daily stock returns. If some agents act as liquidity providers one should obtain negative autocorrelation of returns as evidence of some implicit bid-ask bounce. If, on the contrary, some speculators exploit their private information and liquidity provided by noise traders, it should lead to a price under-reaction to information, which is then raised in later periods, as information becomes public, thus inducing positive autocorrelation (see Llorente et al. 2002 ). An alternative proxy for the liquidity provision is a dummy for the location of the company headquarters in Berlin. The rationale behind it is the following: we assume that the location of the headquarters of large stakeholders was the same as company headquarters, and they should have been in Berlin in order to be physically able to act as liquidity providers. The second assumption made here is that if it was physically possible large stakeholders would provide liquidity on Berlin Stock Exchange. Admittedly, the imposed assumptions are quite strong (for instance, a custodian bank of a non-Berlin resident company might have operated through an affiliate at the company's location), so we use this proxy only to reinforce findings obtained with our primary proxy.
Some evidence for the information asymmetry and liquidity provision hypotheses can be obtained from a simple cross section regression of average transaction costs on the log of the market capitalization and one of our proxies. One should nevertheless be cautious as Amihud and Mendelson (1986) reveals the possibility of a reversed causal relationship: transaction costs can raise expected returns and thus reduce the market capitalization of a company. To avoid the endogeneity problem and to ensure the pre-determinacy we use the market capitalization of 1892 (which is measured at the beginning of the year) to explain company transaction costs averaged over the twenty-two year sample. With regard to autocorrelation we cannot ensure pre-determinacy, as the coefficient is measured over the same period as transaction costs.
Another issue possibly relevant for transaction costs is tick size, which was 0.05 percent of the nominal (face) value of a stock. Thus, our transaction costs measure expressed in percent of the price could be higher for stocks with lower value.
Testing both hypotheses and controlling for tick size we obtain for the twenty-six companies (standard errors of estimates are in parenthesis): 7 
The coefficient for log market capitalization is highly significant and supports the hypothesis that size reduces transaction costs: raising the market capitalization by 2.3
million Mark (what corresponds to a one unit change of log market capitalization at the mean of the variable) leads to 0.19 percentage point lower transaction costs. 8 In addition, market capitalization explains almost two thirds of the inter-company transaction cost variation in our sample. 9 We do not, however, find support for a positive influence of market making: the coefficient of the return autocorrelation is insignificant and of the wrong sign. The reason could be that negative autocorrelation arises not only from liquidity provision but also from zero return days, as the stock reverses its return to its long-run mean on the first day of trading afterwards (see Campbell et al. 1997) . Since the LOT measure is correlated with the proportion of zero return days and is measured over the same period, the opposite relationship emerges. Therefore, using the other proxy of liquidity provision would be more adequate: 7 We exclude Bochumer Bergwerk henceforth from the analysis, as it has unusually high transaction costs due to several months long periods of non-trading. 8 Our estimation coincides with the one reported by Gehrig and Fohlin (2006) for the year 1900 for the log of the book value and is considerably close to their results for 1890 and 1910. 9 Using equation (11) we could address the size bias, in the previous sub-section: Since the average (log) market cap in our sample is about 1.5 units higher than the population average in 1900, the population average transaction costs can be expected to be about 29 basis points higher than reported in Table 2 . Still they turn out to be lower than they are in modern emerging markets and for constituents of 2 nd tier developed market indices. 
In fact, we obtain the predicted relationship -the possible liquidity provision lowers transaction costs by 16 basis points -which is significant on the 10% level.
Including the (log) price level at the beginning of the sample does not significantly help to explain the cross-section of transaction costs, neither in specification (11) nor in specification (12).
However, given that the liquidity, market capitalization, and price level substantially varies over the 22 years' period, using the first year and average values could be insufficient to uncover the hypothesized relationship. Therefore, we run regressions of type (11)- (12) in a balanced panel set-up with individual effects, after some straightforward modifications. We assume that trade volume is proportional to market capitalization not only across companies, but also across time. If higher trading volume of larger firms is associated with lower transaction costs, then we should find the same relationship in the panel regression as in the cross section regressions (11) and (12). As market capitalization is clearly non-stationary over the 22 year sample, we use the fraction of the overall market capitalization contributed by each company. Furthermore, we include the aggregate annual trade volume of all securities in Imperial Germany per year, which, under our assumption of proportionality, should capture changes in the overall market capitalization. In order to treat the non-stationarity of log price levels we take first differences and obtain returns (neglecting dividends). To address the previously outlined reverse causality problem we use lagged log price changes. Since market capitalization is reported for the beginning of each year, we do not face possible reverse causality with regard to this variable. We use also daily return autocorrelations, measured over the previous year, to ensure that they are predetermined with respect to transaction costs.
Since the Hausman test result allows using random effects, we apply this more efficient specification alternative. As transaction costs are believed to be rather persistent (5) GMM (6)GMM (7) Values marked with ***, ** and * are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. R 2 is calculated as one minus the fraction of the residual variance to the variance of the dependent variable.
All columns in Table 3 Previous year log price changes have a negative impact on transaction costs, which is significant in all specifications but GMM with crises dummies (columns 1-6 of Table 3 ).
This result supports the findings of Griffin et al. (2004) and Bekaert et al. (2007) , who find that returns help predicting liquidity on modern financial markets. Our primary liquidity provision proxy -previous year daily returns first-order autocorrelation -is insignificant in the random effects specification (column 2) and is of the wrong sign, as in the cross-section. However, in the GMM specification it is positive and significant at the 5 percent level. This discrepancy has the following intuitive explanation: whereas when estimating the model with random effects we can not control for the zero return channel of negative autocorrelation, in the GMM specification the lagged LOT measure, which is strongly dependent on the proportion of zero returns, can capture them rather well. The explanatory power of the liquidity provision seems, however, to be rather low, below one percentage point.
The impact of our alternative proxy for liquidity provision -the location of headquarters of a stock issuing company in Berlin -can be estimated only in random effects set-up (column 3), as it is time invariant. The coefficient is of the correct sign and is weakly significant. The presence of a liquidity provider on spot decreases transaction costs by 12 basis points.
Standard random effects regression residuals exhibit a strong and highly significant autocorrelation. 12 In fact, the DPD-GMM model estimates in columns 5-7 reveal highly significant autoregressive coefficients for illiquidity, supporting earlier empirical evidence of the persistence of transaction costs (Bekaert et al. 2007 , Amihud 2002 .
Hence, we find some support for increasing illiquidity with rising information asymmetry or a larger information-to-noise ratio. In particular, a decline in company size leads to higher illiquidity. The evidence is weaker for the relevance of corporate distress periods for illiquidity. Contemporaneous backdrops in trading activity and crises deteriorate liquidity significantly. Moreover, liquidity supply by large stakeholders seems to keep transaction costs somewhat lower.
Transaction costs, liquidity, and asset prices
The large dispersion of transaction costs should be reflected in asset pricing. Here we test three hypotheses of the liquidity impact. To perform the tests we analyze excess returns, calculated as total returns (price changes plus dividends) less the risk free rate. Including dividends is important as the companies may compensate investors with higher dividends for lower prices. In line with the asset pricing literature, we use monthly return data. We run Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions with Shanken (1992) corrections for the traditional CAPM and several multifactor extensions, including transaction costs, serial daily return autocorrelation, liquidity risk beta, and we control for size. 14 The liquidity risk beta is calculated as a regression slope of unpredicted individual illiquidity shocks on market return shocks. Unpredicted illiquidity shocks are residuals of a panel VAR(2) of annual returns and illiquidity measures (analog to Bekaert et al., 2007) . As the risk free rate proxy we use the money market rate obtained from the NBER (series: 13018). Size is the log of market capitalization and varies on an annual basis. Transaction costs are our LOT estimates, which also vary yearly. Market betas and the first-order autocorrelation coefficient of daily price percentage changes are constant for each company throughout the sample. We also include a constant as we do not demean the explanatory variables.
13 Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Gernandt et al. (2011) choose another risk channel -sensitivity of individual stock returns to market liquidity shocks. Whereas Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) , using, however, a substantially different liquidity specification, find liquidity risk relevant for pricing of assets on modern US markets, Gernandt et al. (2011) find no significant impact of liquidity risk on asset pricing on the Swedish stock market between 1901 and 1919. 14 We are aware of possible within firm and within month error clustering, as outlined in Petersen (2009).
Having a considerably greater time dimension than cross-section dimension makes the within month clustering the primary problem. However, as Petersen (2009) shows, Fama-MacBeth (1973) technique is able to address it adequately. Turning to within firm clustering, it could be a problem in our data at a first glance, as our right hand side variables are very persistent, since transaction costs change only yearly and betas and autocorrelation coefficient stay constant throughout the sample. But our dependent variablereturn -is not persistent at all, thus yielding slightly negatively correlated residuals and thus nullifying the problem of underestimation of standard errors. (2)- (5) Values marked with ***, ** and * are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Average R 2 is an arithmetic mean of R 2 for each cross-section.
As expected, the premium for transaction costs is significant and positive in all specifications (see Table 4 ). A one percentage point higher transaction cost (which is equivalent to moving from the most liquid stocks to the bottom of our sample, see Appendix 1) raises expected monthly return by 25 to 33 basis points or 3 percent to almost 4 percent annually, depending on the specification. This range covers the 3.5 percent annual premium obtained by Acharya and Pedersen (2005) for the US valueweighted portfolios in 1964-1999. The illiquidity premium estimates also suggest an average holding period of three to four months, which is required for returns net of transaction costs to become equal across different stocks. Furthermore, our results based on the primary proxy yield a discount for liquidity provision, which is significant on the 10% level (see Table 4 The illiquidity risk premium is, as predicted by theory, negative. The sign is due to undesired negative sensitivity of illiquidity to market movements: negative market shocks increase illiquidity and vice versa. Thus, the expected return is higher for those stocks, which liquidity deteriorates during market downturns. Our result for the premium on the individual illiquidity sensitivity to market returns is statistically highly significant, in line with results obtained by Lee (2011) for a large battery of stocks from 54 countries and the 1988-2007 sample period (Lee 2011, Tables 3-4) , whereas Acharya and Pedersen (2005) for modern US data fail to find a statistically significant premium for this liquidity risk channel alone. The economic extent of the liquidity risk effect in our data is rather strong: if sensitivity to liquidity risk moves from 0 to -0.7 (about one standard deviation) the expected return increases by 14 basis points per month. The difference between maximum and minimum liquidity risk sensitivity is about four times as large and would lead to a 55 basis points increase (see Appendix 7). Annualizing the full range move in liquidity sensitivity would yield a 6.6 percent return increase, which by far exceeds the overall liquidity risk effects of 1.1 percent, reported by Acharya and Pedersen (2005: 398) for the US and 1.5 percent reported by Lee (2011) for the global market, but is comparable to the economic effect of 5.6 percent for modern emerging markets (Lee 2011: 146) .
Moreover, our results reveal that the CAPM does not hold since the market risk premium is insignificant in all four specifications, which is consistent with empirical results of Gernandt et al. (2011) for the contemporary (1901) (1902) (1903) (1904) (1905) (1906) (1907) (1908) (1909) (1910) (1911) (1912) (1913) (1914) (1915) (1916) (1917) (1918) (1919) Swedish stock market and with results of Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and Lee (2011) for modern US and global data. In addition, there is no significant size effect, which supports the result of Lee (2011) for modern stocks except emerging markets. Seemingly, size to a large extent proxies liquidity risk, which is much better captured here by transaction costs. However, the inclusion of the size variable increases, due to correlation with transaction costs, the standard error of the latter coefficient, which leads to some loss in significance of illiquidity.
The results of this subsection suggest that liquidity solely drives asset pricing and causes expected return variation of the magnitude of 7 percent (liquidity level plus informed trading differences) to 9.6 percent (liquidity level plus liquidity risk differences) per year. It shows that investors value liquidity even more in a more efficient call De-facto liquidity provision seems to raise the company value by considerable amount (about 4 percent p.a.).
V. Robustness checks
The results of the previous section rely upon the assumption that the standard LOT measure is a good proxy of illiquidity. To address concerns that this is not the case, we also repeat the tests for alternative indirect measures of transaction costs, which include a multifactor extension of the LOT measure and the proportion of zero returns.
The standard estimate of LOT may be distorted by a falsely specified function of latent returns (market model). A straightforward extension is to include excess returns to the SMB portfolio as a risk factor.
To construct the SMB portfolio we form "small" and "big" portfolios, which are equally weighted portfolios of the smallest five and largest five companies respectively.
Portfolios are rebalanced at the beginning of each year based on 1 January market capitalization. The SMB factor return is calculated as a return of a portfolio with a unit long position in the "small" portfolio and a unit short position in the "big" portfolio. The list of the constituent companies is in Appendix 5. In fact, the augmented market model explains non-zero returns sufficiently better than a simple market model: the average R- Augmented LOT measure has a higher variance in the cross-section: transaction costs for low-liquidity stocks tend to be higher and for the high-liquidity ones tend to be lower.
Qualitative findings on liquidity and transaction costs drivers remain in general the same: liquidity is lower for small and distressed stocks and declines in crises periods (Table 7) . However, the effect of the liquidity provision proxy becomes statistically insignificant (even though being of the correct sign in the GMM specification). Values marked with ***, ** and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. R 2 is calculated as one minus the fraction of the residual variance to the variance of the dependent variable.
Asset pricing analysis with Augmented LOT supports our previous findings (see Table   8 ): there is a substantial liquidity premium of about the same magnitude, which is statistically significant at least on the 10 percent level if we do not include the size characteristics. The primary liquidity provision proxy tends to lead to lower expected returns, and the liquidity risk premium is of a similarly high economic and statistic significance. Thus, the choice of a possibly incomplete model for the latent returns seems not to distort our finding on the drivers of illiquidity as well as on the impact of illiquidity and market makers on the prices of assets. Shanken (1992) correction, and are reported in parenthesis. Values marked with ***, ** and * are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Average R 2 is an arithmetic mean of R 2 for each cross-section.
To address deeper concerns with the LOT measure, such as LOT being distorted by idiosyncratic variance we also use an illiquidity measure which does not involve statistical estimation -namely the proportion of zero returns. We calculated the proportion of days with zero returns for each security for each month, as well as annually aggregated. The proportion of zero returns is substantially correlated with our LOT transaction costs estimates (ρ=0.68), so that zero returns alone explain a bit less than one half of the variance of transaction costs estimates (R 2 =0.47). Values marked with ***, ** and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. R 2 is calculated as one minus the fraction of the residual variance to the variance of the dependent variable.
Despite the less than perfect correlation of LOT with the proportion of zero returns, all main qualitative findings remain the same (see Table 9 ). The alternative illiquidity measure is negatively related to company size, the relationship is significant on the at least 10 percent level in five out of seven specifications. The number of days with zero returns is also significantly larger after lower price percentage changes. The negative impact of turnover on this measure of illiquidity is, however, significant only in GMM specifications.
Our main proxy for liquidity provision is insignificant in the GMM specification. Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedure with the Shanken (1992) correction, and are reported in parentheses. Values marked with ***, ** and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Average R 2 is an arithmetic mean of R 2 for each cross-section.
As for the asset pricing, the results are also qualitatively about the same: the illiquidity premium is significant, whereas size and market risk are not (see Table 10 ). The premium for daily autocorrelation is positive, but slightly short of significance on the 10 percent level. The illiquidity risk premium is of the correct sign and significant at the 10% level.
VI. Conclusion
We find an early call auction market at the Berlin Stock Exchange about as liquid as modern stock exchanges with transaction costs averaging about one percent between 1892 and 1913 according to the measure proposed by Lesmond et al. (1999) . Thus, transaction costs a century ago were quite similar to today's cost, possibly due to the efficient trading design. We find some robust evidence that the ratio of informed to uninformed investors drives liquidity: we find significantly higher transaction costs for cases, where this ratio is believed to be higher: for small and distressed stocks.
Moreover, in line with liquidity risk literature, liquidity deteriorates in the periods of rapid and stark market downturns.
Liquidity seems to matter even more for investors on our early call auction market than nowadays, as it emerges as the main driver of asset pricing. We find economically and statistically significant liquidity level and liquidity risk premia, whereas market risk has no impact. The economic scale of liquidity risk premium exceeds by far the ones reported for modern day data. Therefore, we provide evidence of a stronger role of liquidity than the literature on the modern markets with continuous trading. Subsequent research could clarify whether this rather high relevance of liquidity is due to the market design or different liquidity preferences at the turn of the 20 th century.
We find also evidence of a discount for the presence of implicit market makers, thus the presence of liquidity providers per se seems to create substantial value on top of the general liquidity level. The scale of this effect suggests that it deserves a further study.
A possible line of further research could explore whether implicit liquidity providers moderate liquidity risk and decrease expected return through this channel. In particular, one could analyze the actions of potential liquidity providers during unexpected market downturns, and their impact on asset pricing. In this context future research could make use of a larger number of measures for liquidity provision from the data available for modern stock markets. 
